Brazil
Lazy, hazy days for lucky Lula
Better times sap the will to reform, among government and opposition
alike
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Peter
Schrank |
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THESE are
strange times in Brazil. Every morning, the country's main newspapers
bring fresh instalments in a slew of corruption scandals lapping
around the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The
latest one involves the president of the senate, Renan Calheiros, a
Lula ally. He faces widespread calls to resign over allegations that a
lobbyist for a construction firm made regular payments to a journalist
with whom he had an affair and a child. In another case, involving
illegal slot-machines, federal police questioned one of Lula's
brothers over alleged influence-peddling.
The government
seems trapped in torpidity. Six months into his second term, Lula has
just completed his cabinet, adding a 37th minister — one for
“strategic planning”. But what are all these ministers for? The
government's agenda is unambitious, and its reaction to events often
tardy and fumbling. Take the chaos that has gripped Brazil's airports
since October as a result of go-slows by disgruntled air-traffic
controllers. Marta Suplicy, the tourism minister, seemed to sum up the
official stance when, to much outrage, she suggested that travellers
should “relax and enjoy” the long delays. On June 22nd the government
finally sacked 14 controllers — an action it could have taken months
ago.
Brazilians often
gripe that their politicians, ensconced in Brasília, live in pampered
isolation from everyday realities. Yet perhaps it is the newspapers,
for all the polished competence of their investigations, which are
living in a bubble. They are read by the few: Folha de São Paulo, the
biggest-selling daily, shifts only 300,000 copies in a country of 190m
people. Meanwhile, the average Brazilian is rather content, less
interested in the television news than the soap opera that follows it.
Scandals notwithstanding, the president is hugely popular. In São
Paulo's gritty periphery “everyone loves Lula,” says Afonso Gonçalves,
who owns a small supermarket in the suburb of São Bernardo, where the
president was once a trade-union leader. “He focused on the poor. He's
the people's president.”
It is not hard
to spot the reasons for the public mood. In many ways, Brazil is doing
better than it has for a generation. Inflation is low and economic
growth is steadily rising. Aloizio Mercadante, who chairs the Senate's
economic-affairs committee, reels off many other positive numbers: the
current account is in surplus; the fall in the public debt is ahead of
target; the Central Bank's benchmark interest rate has fallen from
27.6% in 2002 to 12% today; total wages in the economy have grown by
8% over the past year; investment is up 7% over the same period; and
consumption has risen for 15 consecutive quarters.
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Brazil is
benefiting hugely from high world prices for its commodity exports and
abundant global liquidity, as well as from the economic reforms of
Lula's predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. “Lula is a lucky man,”
says Maílson da Nóbrega, a former finance minister. But he adds that
Lula has contributed to his own good fortune: he kept Mr Cardoso's
fiscal and monetary policies and gave the Central Bank operational
independence. By not hesitating to raise interest rates when inflation
threatened, the bank's governor, Henrique Meirelles, has won
investors' trust. That, together with the export boom, has brought a
steady appreciation of the real (see chart).
The strong
currency has helped to boost purchasing power, especially that of
poorer Brazilians for whom lower food prices are a particular boon (as
is a government anti-poverty programme that reaches 11m families). But
the currency's strength has some industrialists grumbling; the real is
overvalued by 20%, argues Paulo Skaf, the head of the São Paulo
federation of industry. Some Brazilian firms have responded by opening
factories abroad, from China to Argentina. The government this month
offered cheap credit to producers of shoes, textiles and furniture who
are struggling in the face of Chinese competition.
Mr Skaf and
others argue that the real's strength underlines the case for
structural reforms —of taxes, pension, labour laws and infrastructure
— in order to cut the cost of doing business. Brazil is still growing
more slowly than the world economy. Without reform, the sustainable
rate of growth is no more than 4% a year, many economists say. As Mr
Cardoso puts it: “we have to compete not with our past but with our
competitors.”
The government's
response is, in essence, that it does not believe in reform for
reform's sake. Franklin Martins, the president's press secretary,
argues that Brazil can grow at up to 5.5% a year without further
reforms. Any change to the labour laws that would take away rights
from those Brazilians who work in the formal economy is “not a
priority”, he says. Pension reform is, but only for new workers. He
adds that tax reform may be possible in two years' time, when the
government should need less money to pay its debts.
This may make
for mediocre economics but it is astute politics. Even the opposition
has lost much of its reformist impulse. Mr Cardoso's Party of
Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) has been disarmed by Lula's adoption
of many of its economic and social policies. Its former coalition
partner, the (conservative) Party of the Liberal Front, has changed
its name to the Democrats as part of a stampede for the middle ground
of Brazilian politics. The opposition's attempt to make corruption the
issue in last year's presidential election rebounded: most Brazilians
like and trust Lula, if not all of his followers. Besides, as life
improves, people are paying less attention to corruption and the legal
formalities of public life, laments Mr Cardoso.
In the medium
term, the chance of further reform may depend on the PSDB, which under
Mr Cardoso laid the foundations of economic stability and a stronger
democracy in the 1990s. The party has two plausible candidates for the
next presidential election in 2010 in José Serra and Aécio Neves,
respectively the governors of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. But it now
lacks a programme. “We have a good chance to be a governing party
again, but to do what?” asks Mr Cardoso. He says the PSDB needs to be
less scared of advocating modernisation, reform and further
privatisation.
Lula's Workers'
Party lacks a strong candidate to follow the president, who under the
constitution cannot run in 2010 (but might be able to in 2014). For
now, however, Lula stands supreme in Brazil. Rather than governing, he
reigns above party while “Brazil is on automatic pilot,” says
Gaudêncio Torquato, a political consultant in São Paulo. Unlike some
of its would-be air travellers, at least it has taken off.
Fonte: The Economist, 28/6/2007.
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